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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, presiding. 
RICHARD S. DALEBOUT 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
M. ELAINE BROWN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
Case No. 15,638 
WENDELL V. MILLER, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff sued the defendant on a 
promissory note, and. the defendant counterclaimed to 
have the entire transaction set aside and his down 
payment returned to him. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
for Utah County, State of Utah, sitting without a jury. 
The Court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff 
on the theory of caveat emptore and entered judgment 
for respondent, with costs and attorney's fees. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits that the alleged contract 
sued upon was totally devoid of consideration and 
therefore the transaction should be set aside. The 
promissory note should be voided, and the appellant 
should have judgment against the respondents for the 
$3, 750.00 down payment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April, 1977, the plaintiff offered to sell 
the defendant for $7,500.00 a "business" that she had 
started six months previously. The "business" consisted 
of buying restaurant supplies such as food, paper pro-
ducts and chemicals from wholesale houses in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and reselling them to restaurants and 
diners in Price, Utah. 
Mr. Miller, the defendant, paid $3, 7 50. 00 cash 
down payment and a like amount in the form of a 
promissory note. In the course of the transaction, 
there was an earnest money agreement and a promissory 
note, but there never was an:y writ ten contract defining 
the rights of the parties. 
The plaintiff operated the business from her 
h · h d h name "L.D. 's Fi"ne Foods." ome in Provo, Uta , un er t e 
The plaintiff requested that the defendant use a 
-2-
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different name when he started selling in Price. 
(Record at 14.) There were no assets involved in the 
sale: no delivery vehicles, no inventory, no accounts 
receivable. The only thing allegedly transferred in 
the sale was the supposed "good will" of the business. 
(Record at 32 - 33.) 
Both parties sued -- Mrs. Brown to enforce 
payment of the promissory note and Mr. Miller to void 
the contract and have his down payment returned. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A CONTRACT MUST BE SUPPORTED 
BY CONSIDERATION TO BE VALID 
AND LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE. 
The above statement is basic contract law 
needing no supporting citations. Reference to 
17 C.J.S. Contracts Section 71 will provide ample 
authorities. It is treated briefly here merely because 
it is the major premise of a syllogism herein. The 
minor premise, to be treated in Point II, is that there 
was no consideration in this case; the conclusion is 
that the transaction should be set aside. 
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 75, 
defines consideration as follows: 
Consideration for a promise is 
(a) An act other than a promise, or 
-3-
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(b) A forbearance, or 
(c) The creation, modification or destruction 
of a legal relation, or 
(d) A return promise, 
bargained for and given in exchange for the 
promise. 
We must examine this case to see if the plaintiff 
gave anything that would qualify as consideration in 
return for the defendant's $7,500.00. If she did not, 
then the contract is not legally enforceable and the 
$7,500.00 must be returned to the defendant. See 
General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976). 
POINT II 
THE ONLY CONSIDERATION 
ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS "GOOD WILL," YET THERE 
WAS NO GOOD WILL TO BE 
TRANSFERRED HERE. 
"Good will" is a term of art in the law. It 
is used to refer to a somewhat ethereal quality -- the 
likelihood that customers will patronize a particular 
business. The elements that constitute good will have 
been delineated by the courts. In Vercimak v. Ostoi.£!:, 
118 Utah 253, 221 P.2d 602 (1950), this Court stated 
. ' 
that "one of the elements in good will is continuity 0 ' 
place." 221 P.2d at 604. 
-4-
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The chief elements of good will are 
continuity of time and continuity of 
place. Good will means an established 
business at a given place with the 
patronage that attaches to the name and 
location. Avery v. Lyons, 331 P.2d 906, 
(Kan. 1958). 
"A firm or trade name is re?,arded as inseparable 
from good will." O'Hara v. Lance, 267 P.2d 725 (Ariz. 
1954.) 
"Good will has no existence as property in and 
of itself but is an incident of a continuing business 
having locality or name." Lerner v. Stone, 252 P.2d 
5 2 2 (Co 1 o . 19 5 2) . 
The only thing the plaintiff claims to have 
sold is the "good will" of the business. The deposition 
of Larry Brown, who is the plaintiff's husband and has 
served as advisor' and counselor to her (and with whom 
the defendant primarily dealt in the sale), is quoted 
as follows: 
Question: Did the $7,500.00 figure include 
any inventory? 
Answer: No. 
Question: Did it include any accounts 
receivable? 
Answer: No. 
Question: Did it include any tangible property 
of any kind? 
Answer: The good will of the business. 
-5-
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Question: Did it include any tangible products 
of any kind? 
Answer: No. 
5 - 6.) 
(Deposition of Larry Brown at 
The plaintiff reiterated this fact in her 
testimony at trial. (Record at 32 - 33.) 
At the request of the plaintiff, Mr. Miller 
did not use the name of L.D. 's Fine Foods, although he 
desired to do so. (Record at 14.) 
The plaintiff conducted a "business" out of 
her home for less than six months under a name that was 
not transferred in the sale. There was no product that 
carried the firm name. The plaintiff did not agree to 
forbear from competing with Mr. Miller after the sale. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that there was transferred 
any continuity of time, location or name; hence, there 
was no good will and no consideration. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY GOOD 
WILL TO SELL, IT COULD NOT BE 
BARGAINED AND SOLD INDEPENDENTLY. 
Courts of law and taxation authorities have 
struggled with the concept of good will. Out of this 
struggle have grown several time-honored doctrines 
governing the sale or disposition of good will. 
of the cardinal rules is that good will has no 
existence as property in and of itself but is an 
-6-
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incident of a continuing business having locality or 
name. Lerner v. Stone, supra. 
In a case dealing with this issue the Utah 
S~preme Court elaborated on this principle. In 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966), 
this Court stated: 
Good will is property, so recognized 
and protected by law. As such it is subject 
to bargain and sale. There has been a 
rather general acceptance by the courts 
that good will exists as property 
incidentally to other property rights 
and is not susceptible of being owned 
and disposed of separately from property 
rights to which it is an incident. 
[Citations omitted.] 
It has been repeatedly held that 
there can be no "good will" so-called, of 
a business which depends for its existence 
upon the professional qualities of the 
persons who carry it on. 
SUMMARY 
The plaintiff supposedly sold a "business" 
to Wendell Miller. the appellant, for $7,500.00. In 
reality, Mr. Miller got nothing. The only thing 
allegedly sold was the "good will of the business," 
which was nonexistent in the first place, and which 
can't be sold in and of itself in the second place. 
Since there never was any consideration, and hence no 
valid contract, Mr. Miller should have his money 
-7-
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restored to him, and his note cancelled. 
I\" -ti~ Respectfully submitted this ,.)__________ day of 
April, 1978. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to Richard S. Dalebout, 60 East 100 
South, Suite 100, Provo, Utah 84601, this _Jr/.. day 
of April, 1978, first class postage prepaid. 
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